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principles (and, for that matter, an array of rules of inference as
well), is not, we daresay, very easy. Logicians can crack syllogisms
in seconds, yes. But if you tried to configure your 403(b) in a
thoroughly rigorous, decontextualized way, how long did it take
you?
Other, arguably even deeper, problems spring from the sim-
plicity of the problems that currently anchor the rationality de-
bate. It seems bizarre to define general intelligence as the capac-
ity to solve very easy problems. For example, Raven’s Progressive
Matrices, that vaunted “culture-free” gauge of g, can be mechan-
ically solved (Carpenter et al. 1990). Once one assimilates and de-
ploys the algorithm, does one suddenly become super-intelligent?
Would a computer program able to run the algorithm and thereby
instantly solve the problems, be counted genuinely intelligent?
Hardly. (For more on this issue, see Bringsjord 2000. And recall
Sternberg’s continuous complaint that “being smart” in the ordi-
nary sense has precious little to do with solving small, tightly de-
fined test problems, a complaint communicated to some degree
in his first-round commentary; cf. Sternberg 2000.)
Another problem arising from the fact that the rationality de-
bate is tied to very easy problems is that psychology of reasoning
is thereby structurally unable to articulate theories of robust hu-
man reasoning. Mental logic (championed, for example, by Rips
1994) cannot account for disproofs of the sort we gave above 
(because such disproofs are necessarily meta-proofs carried out
outside a fixed set of inference schemas); and mental models the-
ory (Johnson-Laird 1983), which rejects elaborate sequences of
purely syntactic inferences, would seem to at least have a difficult
time accounting for solutions to the problem we leave you with be-
low (about which we’ve just given you a hint). What is needed is a
theory of human reasoning that partakes of both the proof theo-
retic and semantic sides of symbolic logic, and the formal metathe-
ory that bridges these two sides. (For a synoptic presentation of all
this terrain, in connection to cognition and reasoning, see
Bringsjord & Ferrucci 1998. For a theory of human reasoning de-
signed to cover all of this terrain, Mental MetaLogic, see (Yang &
Bringsjord, under review.)
Finally, what would be an example of a reasoning problem that
isn’t very easy, and the solving of which might justify confidence
that the solver is both poised for success in the high-tech twenty-
first century, and genuinely intelligent? Well, here’s one; we refer
to it as “The Bird Problem”: Is the following statement true or
false? Prove that you are correct.
(7) There exists something which is such that, if it’s a bird, then
everything is a bird.
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Abstract: Individual differences are indeed an important aid to our un-
derstanding of human cognition, but the importance of the rationality de-
bate is open to question. An understanding of the process involved, and
how and why differences occur, is fundamental to our understanding of
human reasoning and decision making.
The main thesis of Stanovich & West (S&W) is that differences in
individuals’ performance can be used to cast light on the rational-
ity debate. Even if we accept that this issue is important, and that
humans occasionally behave irrationally, we still need clear crite-
ria to identify such behaviour. Responses by themselves are often
taken to be sufficient, but these are only informative if the cogni-
tive processes underlying them are also understood. Otherwise,
there is little to gain by addressing the rationality question. This
problem applies equally to the interpretation of psychometric test
scores. Intelligence is a poorly understood construct, and the sug-
gestion that it reflects only working memory capacity is by no
means fully accepted.
Although highly intelligent people may be more likely to give
normative responses in reasoning and decision-making tasks than
less intelligent people, correlations between test score and rea-
soning performance can occur for a variety of reasons. Hence,
differential correlations are not necessarily informative, and the
focus on individual differences in terms of outputs rather than
processes means that important qualitative differences are over-
looked. The most straightforward reason for a correlation be-
tween intelligence test score and performance at a reasoning task
is that highly intelligent people use the same processes as less in-
telligent people, but execute them more effectively. However,
this merely leads us back to a “cognitive limitations” account of
irrational behavior. Alternatively, perhaps highly intelligent peo-
ple are better able to use different, more complex processes. A
further possibility is that they are more likely to use different
processes, but these are simpler, and hence more efficient. Ei-
ther possibility leads into a debate about whether the strategy se-
lections, rather than the responses themselves, are rational. A res-
olution depends crucially upon the ability to identify reasoning
strategies accurately at the level of the individual. However, even
where this is possible, we have to be certain that a suboptimal
strategy, that is, one that is linked to poor performance, is really
failing because of fundamental flaws. If, instead, a strategy is po-
tentially normative, but too demanding to be executed accurately,
then this turns the rationality issue into a debate concerning
whether a person has made a strategy choice commensurate with
his or her own ability to execute it accurately – and, ultimately,
we are again returned to a cognitive limitations explanation of ir-
rational behavior.
Given that people differ in the strategies they use, the rational-
ity debate forces a dichotomy on us: are these choices normative
or non-normative? Suppose you are presented with a series of tri-
als, each consisting of compass point directions given together
(e.g., one step north, one step east, one step north, one step west,
one step south, one step south, one step west, one step north). The
task is to determine the end point, relative to the start, after tak-
ing the steps. The natural strategy for this task is spatial: The full
path is traced in the mind or by using a finger. For the cancella-
tion strategy – a task specific short-cut – opposite steps are can-
celled, with the remainder forming the correct response. Both
strategies are normative: where applied accurately, they will yield
the correct response. However, the spatial strategy is slower, less
accurate and more demanding to execute. People are often
painfully aware of the need to find an alternative. Surprisingly,
even amongst university students, cancellation is used only by the
minority. This is because it is only available to people with suffi-
ciently high spatial ability to be able to identify the redundant
processes of the spatial strategy and delete them, leading to the
discovery of cancellation. Hence, people with high spatial ability
outperform the rest, not because they are executing the spatial
strategy more efficiently, nor because they are better able to use
an enhanced spatial strategy in which additional processes in-
crease accuracy, but because they have dispensed with spatial rep-
resentations altogether, increasing accuracy and minimising effort
(see Newton & Roberts 2000; Roberts et al. 1997).
So, are the spatial strategy users irrational for this task?
Granted, if we focus on outputs only, they are less accurate than
cancellation users; but, as suggested earlier, the rationality de-
bate is only served crudely in this way. Errors when using the
spatial strategy are due to capacity limitations in any case. The
rationality debate is not served at all by considering whether 
selected strategies are normative – both will yield correct re-
sponses if executed accurately. Are the spatial strategy users less
rational because they made an inappropriate choice? No, there
is no alternative available to them, and hence no choice. If thespatial strategy users must be branded as irrational, this can only
be because they lack the necessary resources to discover the
more efficient method. This conceptualisation of irrationality as
a lack of creativity may be unappealing to some, but for this ex-
ample the categorisation of these people as irrational is artificial
and driven only by the perceived need to address the rationality
question.
Overall, S&W make many valid points. We agree that individ-
ual differences are an important aspect of human cognition. But
to use them merely to resolve the rationality debate is problem-
atic and neglects their full potential. Issues of how people reason,
and how these processes change and develop with experience can
be better answered by not being side-tracked in this way.
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